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The Last Indian Raid in Kansas: Context,
Colonialism, and Philip P. Frickey's
Contributions to American Indian Law
Sarah Krakofft
INTRODUCTION: WHAT'S NOT THE MATTER WITH KANSAS?
There are a lot of things that are not the matter with Kansas.I For example,
Lucas, Kansas, is the home of the Garden of Eden museum, a colored cement
sculpture gallery constructed by Samuel P. Dinsmoor, a Civil War veteran and
free thinker who explored his commitment to reasoned enlightenment through
2his elaborate and weirdly gothic art. Kansas also boasts the first Pizza Hut; the
original building is now on exhibit at the Wichita State campus.3 And Kansas
has a fierce history of abolitionism; some of the most violent pre-Civil War
skirmishes over slavery erupted in Bloody Kansas, which also hosts the John
Brown Museum.
But there are two excellent things about Kansas more relevant to this
symposium. First, Phil Frickey, who was one of the best scholars and mentors
in the field of American Indian law, was born and raised there. Second, Kansas
can rightly brag about the Kansas State Historical Society, whose relevance
will become clear soon. But what, other than Phil's origins, does Kansas have
to do with the big questions in American Indian law today? The answer is that
an event described as the "Last Indian Raid in Kansas" by some, and the
Copyright D 2010 California Law Review, Inc. California Law Review, Inc. (CLR) is a
California nonprofit corporation. CLR and the authors are solely responsible for the content of
their publications.
t Professor, University of Colorado Law School. I am grateful to Kathryn Urbanowicz for
research assistance, to my colleagues at the University of Colorado Law School who provided
helpful comments during a workshop on an early draft, to Dean Christopher Edley and Dan Farber
for organizing this wonderful symposium, to Chuck and Diane Frickey for hosting me in Oberlin,
and to Phil Frickey for everything.
1. See THOMAS FRANK, WHAT'S THE MATTER WITH KANSAS? How CONSERVATIVES WON
THE HEART OF AMERICA (2004) (best selling book exploring the state's transformation from
bastion of progressive populism to stalwart of social and political conservatism).
2. See S. P. Dinsmoor's Garden of Eden, http://www.garden-of-eden-lucas-kansas.com/
(last visited Aug. 5, 2009).
3. See Wichita State University, Original Pizza Hut, http://webs.wichita.edul?u=markl
&p=pizzahut (last visited Aug. 5, 2009).
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"Odyssey of the Northern Cheyenne" by others, touched down in the little town
of Oberlin, Kansas, where Phil Frickey grew up. That event, whatever one
chooses to call it, illustrates the centrality of the structural, intergovernmental
relationship4 between tribes and the United States, and the importance of
grounded research about the contexts of federal Indian law-themes that Phil
developed and championed in his scholarship.
This Article will first describe, in Part I, the trajectory of Phil's Indian law
scholarship, tracking in particular the development of the major themes just
described-the centrality of the structural relationship between tribes and the
federal government, and the importance of context. In Part II, it will delve into
the story of Oberlin, Kansas, and the Northern Cheyenne Odyssey, drawing
lessons for contemporary Indian law consistent with Phil's observations about
the field. Those lessons are, first, that it is key to frame Indian law disputes as
structural questions between sovereigns; and, second, that academics can
provide crucial, rigorous, contextualized research about the terrain in which
these disputes occur.
Finally, in Part III, this Article applies lessons from the Last Indian Raid
to a contemporary Indian law issue-the boundaries of tribal control over
Indians who are not members of the governing tribe. Telling thicker stories,
whether about the Last Indian Raid or this particular Indian law issue, allows us
to peek behind the arid judicial formulations of Indian law to see the more
complicated and often troubling reality about the life of Indian law. That, at
least, is one of the lessons that Phil tried to teach through his scholarship, and it
guides this inquiry as it has many others.5
I
THE STAGES OF PHIL FRICKEY'S SCHOLARSHIP IN AMERICAN INDIAN LAW
My first encounter with Phil was through his writing. I was living in Tuba
City, Arizona, on the Navajo Nation and working for DNA-People's Legal
Services.6 I was giving myself a crash course in American Indian law, reading
4. The phrases "structural relationship" and "intergovernmental relationship" will be used
throughout this Article to refer to the idea that Indian tribes have a unique legal and political
relationship with the U.S. government. Phil has argued that when courts address questions about
tribal sovereignty, they should be mindful of the history of power and conflict through which that
relationship was wrought, as well as the judiciary's limited competency to address such questions.
See Part I.B., infra.
5. The influence that Phil Frickey has had on younger Indian law scholars can be detected
partially through the number of authors that thank him in their initial footnote. I am going to cite
just to a small sample here, because an exhaustive list would cause this Article to skyrocket past
the editors' word count limitation. See, e.g., Kristen A. Carpenter, Real Property and Peoplehood,
27 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 313 (2008); Matthew L.M. Fletcher, The Supreme Court's Indian Problem,
59 HASTINGs L.J. 579 (2008); Kevin K. Washburn, American Indians, Crime and the Law, 104
MICH. L. REv. 709 (2006).
6. DNA-People's Legal Services is a nonprofit law firm providing free representation to
Navajo, Hopi, and other clients throughout its service area in the four corners region of the
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by the propane light in my hogan7 in the evening, and hoping that my clients
and coworkers would not notice my stunning ignorance in the field. One of the
first articles I read was Marshalling Past and Present: Colonialism,
Constitutionalism, and Interpretation in Federal Indian Law.8 The piece
resonated because it outlined a way of thinking about the foundational cases in
Indian law-the trilogy by Chief Justice John Marshall 9-that required neither
ignoring the discovery doctrine's racist assumptions, nor discarding the cases
altogether. The assertion that Chief Justice Marshall's approach to Indian law
questions mattered at least as much as any core of unassailable principles gen-
erated by the cases made sense to me in a way that other scholarship did not.'0
From then, I was hooked on Frickey. Somehow Phil, writing from the
secluded vantage point of an academic with little time or experience in Indian
country, could nonetheless make his work relevant to a legal services lawyer
living on the largest Indian reservation in the country. Living amidst Navajo
and Hopi people-with the nearest courthouse, police, and emergency services
for miles being those of the Navajo Nation-it made sense to me that "a revival
of Chief Justice Marshall's legacy" would "compel[] [judges] to view Indian
law afresh in today's context. The issues would be structural, involving
conflicts among sovereigns. . . ."II
This Part will trace the development of Phil's Indian law scholarship,
describe the value he has added to the field, and highlight some recurring
themes. As I see it, Phil's body of work has the following trajectory: it starts
from the perspective of an insightful, if perplexed, outsider and culminates with
the view of a wise and prodding elder. 12 Along the way, Phil provided clear-
eyed descriptions, nuanced normative prescriptions, and sometimes-bracing,
yet always tactful, criticism of both ofjudges and scholars.
In the field of American Indian law, phases of federal-tribal relations are
Southwest. "DNA" is the acronym for the Navajo phrase: "Dinebeiina Nahiilna Be Agha'diit'ahi,"
which translates roughly to "Lawyers working for the Revitalization of the People."
7. Hogans are traditional Navajo one-room dwellings with eight sides and a single door
facing the east.
8. Philip P. Frickey, Marshalling Past and Present: Colonialism, Constitutionalism, and
Interpretation in Federal Indian Law, 107 HARv. L. REV. 381 (1993) [hereinafter Frickey,
Marshalling Past and Present].
9. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832) (holding that Indian tribes have
inherent sovereignty to govern their members and their territory, and that the individual states lack
the power to impose their laws on tribes); Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831)
(holding that Indian tribes are domestic dependent nations, a status distinct from both foreign
nations and individual states); Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823) (holding that
the federal government has the exclusive power to acquire property from tribes).
10. See Frickey, Marshalling Past and Present, supra note 8, at 408-17 (describing
Marshall's interpretive approach in Cherokee Nation v. Georgia and Worcester v. Georgia as
quasi-constitutional).
11. Id. at 428.
12. This latter perspective is particularly evident in Phil's last articles, which encourages
and instigates a new and improved realism in Indian law scholarship.
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typically divided roughly into the following periods: Discovery; Treaty
Making; Removal and Relocation; Allotment and Assimilation; Indian
Reorganization and Self-Government; Termination; and, finally, Self-
Determination.13 To describe the evolution of Phil's approach to American
Indian law, I will borrow some, but not all, of these labels, and apply them to
the different periods of Phil's scholarship. I will start with what I view as Phil's
initial "Discovery" of Indian law and end with his last phase, for which I have
taken some liberties with the label. In terms of federal policy, the United States
is still (at least in some branches of government, excluding the Supreme Court)
in the era of Self-Determination. Where we should be moving, however, both
in the realm of scholarship and policy, is more expansive: building on self-
determination to include reconciliation and revival.
A. Discoveryl4: Phil Frickey Discovers American Indian Law
In his first Indian law article, Congressional Intent, Practical Reasoning,
and the Dynamic Nature of Federal Indian Law, Phil canvassed then-recent
Indian law cases. He concluded that the predominant scholarly view of Indian
law, which he termed "foundationalist," had failed to capture or shape recent
judicial activity in the field.15 The foundationalists argued that Indian law was
best seen as a set of core principles, first announced by Chief Justice Marshall
and coalesced in the mid-twentieth century by Felix Cohen in his famous
treatise. These principles include plenary congressional power over Indian
affairs, retained inherent tribal sovereignty, and canons of interpretation
requiring the Court to construe Indian treaties and legislation for the benefit of
the tribes.'7 However, by 1990 the Court was abandoning these principles in
certain cases, particularly those involving either tribal jurisdiction over non-
Indians or intrusions of state authority into Indian country. And even in the
cases that came out favorably for the tribal interests the Court apparently did
not rely on foundationalist principles.
13. See, e.g., VINE DELORIA, JR. & CLIFFORD M. LYTLE, AMERICAN INDIANS, AMERICAN
JUSTICE 1-24 (1983). The periods, as outlined by these authors, are: Discovery, Conquest, and
Treaty-Making (1532-1828), Removal and Relocation (1828-1887), Allotment and Assimilation
(1887-1928), Reorganization and Self-Government (1928-1945), Termination (1945-1961) and
Self-Determination (1961-present).
14. The period of "Discovery, Conquest and Treaty-Making" comprises the phase of initial
contact between European nations and the indigenous nations of North America. The term
"Discovery" (which has to be read with appropriate irony) derives from the European international
law doctrines employed to assert dominion and control over indigenous lands and peoples under
certain specified conditions. See id. at 2-4.
15. Philip P. Frickey, Congressional Intent, Practical Reasoning, and the Dynamic Nature
ofFederal Indian Law, 78 CALIF. L. REV. 1137, 1239 (1990) [hereinafter Frickey, Congressional
Intent].
16. See FELIX COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW (1942).
17. See Frickey, Congressional Intent, supra note 15, at 1206-07 (describing the
foundational approach and criticizing on descriptive and practical grounds).
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Phil's big message in Congressional Intent was that it is neither credible
nor efficacious to hew to a pristine, coherent view of federal Indian law:
It is clear ... that foundational theory ... is an unlikely candidate
for resolving particular disputes in federal Indian law. In [the recent]
cases, no single value is privileged, and the several values involved are
too complex and cross-cutting, the facts of the cases too uneven, and
the strands of doctrine too tenuous to aggregate into a foundational
theory that can control future cases.
If defenders of the faith successfully persuaded the Court to
preserve what remains of tribal autonomy, the strategy would at least
have the virtue of effectiveness. But . . . today's Court has little
difficulty in avoiding the defenders' conceptual arguments and
continuing the erosion of tribal independence.18
The Court was not listening to the foundational arguments. Even if it had been,
foundationalism, from a scholarly perspective, is unsatisfying, even anachron-
istic. It veers toward an odd and unconvincing formalism and depicts judging
as a mechanistic process divorced from context and contemporary values.
Phil differed by offering a dynamic account of the field, proposing that
certain key background values did a lot of work in contemporary Indian law
cases. These values included a wavering respect for tribal rights, reluctance to
give effect to congressional intent that has been rendered obsolete by later
enactments, and the search for manageable judicial standards.
Additionally, in Congressional Intent, Phil touched on themes that would
recur and become more developed in his later works. One is the revitalizing
role that critical scholarship plays in the field. Another is the emerging
significance of international norms with respect to indigenous peoples. And
finally, one that emerges very prominently in Phil's later work is the tension
between tribes' right to be apart from the U.S. constitutional order-a right
embodied in the sovereign-to-sovereign relationship at the heart of federal
Indian law -and the seemingly ineluctable pull of mainstream constitutional
20and public law values.
I read Congressional Intent shortly after I came to Boulder and was trying
desperately to catch up on scholarship in Indian law. Just as Marshalling Past
and Present (published later, but read earlier by me) instantly resonated, so did
this piece. For a practitioner who had learned the field by working in Indian
country, the idea that context and values, rather than dry concepts, were doing
the work made a great deal of sense. And as a new but always skeptical scholar,
I found compelling the argument that Indian law, like all law, was conceptually
18. Id. at 1206-07 (footnote omitted).
19. Id. at 1201.
20. See id. at 1234 (describing the difficulty of "accommodating Anglo-American
procedural and substantive values while preserving Indian traditions of dispute resolution").
2010] 1257
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untidy, bearing the messy imprint of conflicts over values and power,
B. Treaty PeriodI: Phil Frickey's Insights about ChiefJustice Marshall's
Approach to Treaties
During Phil's Treaty Period, he pursued one thread from Congressional
Intent in depth: that Chief Justice Marshall, in his Indian law trilogy, did more
than state a formula. In Marshalling Past and Present,22 Phil argued that
Marshall adopted an interpretive stance toward treaties that protected the tribal
prerogative to remain a separate people:
In Cherokee Nation and Worcester, Chief Justice Marshall repeatedly
stressed the sovereign-to-sovereign relationship between tribes and the
British crown and its successor, the United States. He rightly
understood that this relationship extended far beyond anything like a
contractual model. Rather, it involved a mixture of brute force ... and
territorial sovereignty . . . . In this context the treaty became, in
essence, the piece of positive law that reflected the constitutive
relationship between two sovereigns. This linkage between the tribe
and the United States, as a matter of law rather than sheer power, was
the element missing in Johnson v. McIntosh.23
Marshall's recognition of a sovereign-to-sovereign structure within the
ineradicable colonialism that preceded it sketched an enduring framework for
courts to follow. Summing up this idea, Phil wrote: "[T]he spirit of the
structural, constitutive approach would force judges to do the hard work ex-
emplified by Marshall in Worcester-to challenge rather than to accept blindly
assumptions rooted in colonialism, of which there are many today . ... 24 The
hard work consists of seeing the individual dispute in any given case through
the lens of the historical inequities that produced, nonetheless, an institutional
and legal commitment to the preservation of tribes as sovereign peoples.
One might see Phil's work during his Treaty Period as a move closer to
foundationalist theory, but to do so would be a mistake. First, Phil had already
emphasized in his earlier work that the concepts behind the foundationalist
approach are good ones: if they guide judges to see the conflicts before them as
structural ones between sovereigns, contesting their respective interests against
the limiting backdrop of colonialism, then those concepts are tools as good as
21. The "Treaty-Making" period in U.S.-Tribal relations commenced when European
nations first began to enter into treaties with the indigenous nations of North America (during the
1500s), and continued until the United States shifted to a policy of removing tribes from their
aboriginal homelands (during the 1820s). See DELORIA & LYTLE, supra note 13, at 2-6. The
United States continued to enter into treaties with tribes well after the beginning of the removal
phase, however, and did not formally end treaty making until 1871. See id. at 5.
22. See Frickey, Marshalling Past and Present, supra note 8.
23. Id. at 408 (footnote omitted).
24. Id. at 428.
1258 [Vol. 98:1253
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any others.25 Second, Phil's essential aim in Marshalling Past and Present was
to rescue Chief Justice Marshall's methodology from the caricature that the
central principles of foundationalism appeared to have become to the
contemporary Court. For example, according to Phil, the Indian law canon
counseling courts to uphold treaty terms unless statutes explicitly abrogate
them "has little bite because it seems so blatantly normative-'you should help
those poor Indians'-and normative in a fuzzy, liberal direction at that."26
Phil's goal was to remind the Justices about the structural, institutional, and
political reasons to emulate Chief Justice Marshall in Worcester, not to chide
them into accepting blindly (and, let's face it, utterly unwillingly) a formula for
coming out in favor of tribes.
C. Removal Period27 : Phil Frickey's Prescription to Remove Indian Law from
Conventional Understandings
In Phil's Removal Period, he wrote two articles suggesting that Indian law
should be removed from the domain of ordinary domestic litigation. In
Adjudication and Its Discontents,28 Phil critiqued two law review articles: one
for marginalizing Indian law norms and interpretive approaches in the context
of Native Hawaiian claims;29 the other for overstating the extent to which a
single explanation-the Court's move toward a members-only view of tribal
sovereignty-drives all contemporary cases.30 (Sadly, this thesis, by L. Scott
Gould, appears more convincing with every subsequent Supreme Court case.) 31
As Phil put it, both of these articles come up short because each, in a different
way, attempts to make Indian law simpler and neater than it is. Consistent with
his claims in Marshalling Past and Present, Phil cautioned against either
looking solely to doctrinal formulations (without doing the hard work of also
consulting the history and norms that give rise to those formulations) or
ascribing to the Court a unitary purpose where none exists. Such scholarship
25. Frickey, Congressional Intent, supra note 15, at 1239.
26. Frickey, Marshalling Past and Present, supra note 8, at 424 (footnote omitted).
27. The period in U.S.-tribal relations of "Removal and Relocation," dating from 1828-
1887, included federal policies of forcibly relocating tribes from their aboriginal homelands to
smaller reservations, typically further west. See DELORIA & LYTLE, supra note 13, at 6-8.
28. Philip P. Frickey, Adjudication and Its Discontents: Coherence and Conciliation in
Federal Indian Law, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1754 (1997) [hereinafter Frickey, Adjudication and its
Discontents].
29. Stuart Minor Benjamin, Equal Protection and the Special Relationship: The Case of
Native Hawaiians, 106 YALE L.J. 537 (1996).
30. L. Scott Gould, The Consent Paradigm: Tribal Sovereignty at the Millennium, 96
COLUM. L. REv. 809 (1996).
31. See, e.g., Plains Commerce Bank v. Long Family Land & Cattle Co., 554 U.S. 316
(2008) (holding that tribal court lacked jurisdiction over discrimination claim brought by tribal
members against non-Indian bank). Plains Commerce is just the latest in a series of cases
winnowing the circumstances in which tribal courts have jurisdiction over non-Indians. See Sarah
Krakoff, Undoing Indian Law One Case at a Time: Judicial Minimalism and Tribal Sovereignty,
50 AM. U. L. REV. 1177,1216-22,1233-36 (2001).
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misprescribes what the Court ought to do next (the doctrinal mistake) 32 or
misdescribes what the Court has already done (the theoretical mistake).33
The piece's enduring value, however, is its conclusion, where Phil
suggests that the greater promise for a decolonized, antiformalist Indian law
lies in the realm of political negotiation and creative intergovernmental
relationships, rather than federal court litigation. Here are Phil's words on the
subject:
In the last analysis, negotiation seems to promise to bring Indians
into Indian law far better than does adjudication. Negotiation turns not
on incoherent or misunderstood legal doctrines, but on practical
realities....
. . . [I]n a field with too much law and too little life, it might be time
for scholars to focus at least as much on questions of legal process as
on matters of legal doctrine. 34
The other article from Phil's Removal Period, Domesticating Federal
Indian Law,35 suggested a different kind of removal: removing a deeply
colonialist version of the congressional plenary power doctrine, and returning
conceptions of Indian sovereignty to their international law roots. This removal
would render contemporary Indian law consonant with evolving international-
law support for cultural and political self-determination for indigenous peoples.
This article is Phil's most normative and idealistic piece. It is right in its
diagnosis, but perhaps, in hindsight, unduly optimistic in its prescription.
Although the United Nations finally ratified the Declaration of the Rights of
Indigenous Peoples, the United States was one of just four countries that voted
against the Declaration.36 While some members of the Court embrace
internationalization of domestic legal norms, the debate about uses of foreign
law is fractious, and, as recently as 2005, all of the Justices appeared to agree
that foreign sources of law are not binding.37 Therefore, as long as American
Indian law is viewed as domestic law, albeit with international origins, rather
than a species of international law as such, it seems unlikely that the Court will
stray from its self-directed course.
Nonetheless, there is a broader, less judicially focused way in which
Phil's prescription may yet come true. As other countries adopt and enforce the
U.N. Declaration, it will normalize and make its way into the domestic law of
32. This is Benjamin's mistake, according to Phil. See Frickey, Adjudication and Its
Discontents, supra note 28, at 1763-64.
33. This is Gould's mistake, according to Phil. See id. at 1776-77.
34. Frickey, Adjudication and Its Discontents, supra note 28, at 1783-84.
35. Philip P. Frickey, Domesticating Federal Indian Law, 81 MINN. L. REV. 31 (1996).
36. See United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/61/295 (Sept. 13, 2007).
37. See Norman Dorson, The Relevance ofForeign Legal Materials in U.S. Constitutional
Cases: A Conversation Between Justice Antonin Scalia and Justice Stephen Breyer, 3 INT'L J.
CONST. L. 519, 530 (2005).
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other countries. In Belize, for example, the country's highest court cited the
Declaration in support of its decision to recognize indigenous claims to
property. 3 8 Furthermore, as global environmental problems like climate change
highlight disparate effects on indigenous peoples as well as the unique
solutions they can contribute,39 it seems at least plausible that international law
will eventually influence aspects of our federal Indian law. And even if it does
not, international fora provide a new avenue for advocacy, and tribes are indeed
using these to assert their own agendas.40
D. Allotment, Assimilation, Termination41: Phil Frickey on the Supreme
Court's Unfortunate Assimilationist Tendencies
Phil wrote two major articles during this stage, in which themes touched
on in earlier work emerge fully. One theme is that the Court is slowly erasing
Indian law as a separate field by harmonizing it with general public law. 4 2 This
tendency does violence to the unique structural relationship between tribes and
the federal government. It thereby freezes tribes in the past, foreclosing the
possibility that they can evolve as sovereigns to assume functions and
responsibilities consonant with their contemporary status in society. Phil also
criticizes the Court for not adopting any defensible guiding principle, either
jurisprudential or value based, for the Court's harmonization of Indian law with
general public law.
The tone in these pieces alternates between optimism and despair. Phil is
generous to the Court, searching diligently for some principled meta-approach
to the Indian law cases examined during this period. But he does not spare the
38. See Cal v. Attorney Gen., [20071 Consol. Claims Nos. 171 & 172 (Belize).
39. See Sarah Krakoff, American Indian Tribes, Climate Change, and Ethics for a
Warming World, 85 DENV. U. L. REv. 865 (2008) (describing disparate effects of climate change
on indigenous peoples and suggesting that native cultural and spiritual values may provide the
best sources for meaningful response).
40. See, e.g., Dann v. United States, Case No. 11.140 (Judgment on the Merits), Inter-Am
C.H.R., Report No. 75/02, doc. 5, rev. 1 (2002) (claim for violation of Declaration of Rights and
Duties of Man brought by Western Shoshone tribal members against the United States).
41. From 1887-1928, the United States passed laws and enforced policies aimed at
breaking up the tribal land base and eliminating Native culture and religion. This period in U.S.-
Indian relations is described as the Allotment and Assimilation period. See DELORIA & LYTLE,
supra note 13, at 8-12. After a respite for tribes during which official federal policy supported
tribal self-governance, Congress once again took aim at the separate political existence of tribes.
Congress severed the federal relationship with several tribes and passed laws authorizing state
jurisdiction over many others. That period, lasting from 1945-1961, is known as the Termination
era. See id at 15-21. I created the label for this period in Phil's scholarship from a conglomeration
of these two distinct periods in Indian law history dominated by the federal goal of eliminating
tribes as separate sovereigns.
42. See Philip P. Frickey, (Native) American Exceptionalism in Federal Public Law, 119
HARV. L. REV. 431 (2005) [hereinafter Frickey, (Native) American Exceptionalism]; Philip P.
Frickey, A Common Law for Our Age of Colonialism: The Judicial Divestiture of Indian Tribal
Authority over Nonmembers, 109 YALE L.J. 1 (1999) [hereinafter Frickey, A Common Law for
Our Age of Colonialism].
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Justices when their solutions appear implausible: "Taken as a whole, the
judicial method in the [reservation] diminishment cases might appear to be
essentially lawless. . . . In totality, the cases suggest that, to adapt an old joke
about Congress, no Indian reservation is safe while the Supreme Court is in
session."4 3 And later in the same article: "[B]y refusing to admit that it is
implementing a general (and repudiated) congressional purpose rather than
explicit congressional intent, the Court has sought to shift the blame for the
erosion of tribal authority to a century-old Congress rather than where it
belongs-the current Court.""
By the end of both of these articles, Phil suggests that the best the
judiciary can do is stay out of it.4 5 The damage has been done, and the Court
lacks the tools--empathy, contextual understanding, a vision of vibrant,
contemporary sovereign tribal governments, an adaptable and historically
grounded sense of pluralism-to stop the hemorrhaging of Indian law.46 Phil
concludes:
In the last analysis, it should be unsurprising that federal Indian law
has turned out as confused as it is. For beneath questions about
constitutional text, original intent, common law authority, and so on
lies a much more fundamental normative confusion-regarding the
founding of the United States and the development of our
constitutional traditions. We have every right to be confused about
what we should make of our origins, our evolution, our sense of
nationhood, and our creation of a constitutional democracy through
colonialism.
After five hundred years, it is high time to face this most
fundamental of confusions....
... Yet for the past three decades, the highest Court of the United
States has been on a decisional path that undercuts tribal prerogatives,
and recently several Justices openly challenged the notion that tribes
should be recognized as self-governing in the first place. Whatever the
appropriate answers are for America, it is exceedingly doubtful that
these judicial solutions are among them. Whatever processes would
produce appropriate results, it is equally doubtful that case-by-case
43. Frickey, A Common Law for Our Age of Colonialism, supra note 42, at 24.
44. Id. at 25.
45. Id. at 81 ("[T]he simplest option for the Court would be to freeze the law as it now
stands, embrace what it can retrieve of the traditional concepts, and force Congress to undertake
any further relief for nonmembers in Indian country.").
46. Frickey, (Native) American Exceptionalism, supra note 42, at 487 (suggesting that the
best the Court can do at this point is to "return to a more modest judicial role, one that provides
side constraints-constitutional and canonical---on the congressional power to invade tribal
prerogatives and that leaves room for the affected parties to negotiate rather than litigate most
issues of twenty-first-century federal Indian law").
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litigation is among them.47
Others in the field have similarly suggested that the best the Court can do
is to stay its hand.48 Indeed, a fairly large group of academics and practitioners
meets regularly to discuss how to keep Indian law cases out of the Supreme
Court if at all possible, and if it is inevitable that they are headed that way,
strategizes about how to cabin the likely damage.49 Yet throughout his previous
work, Phil maintained a hopeful and respectful tone toward the Court, and his
complicated sense of what Indian law was never seemed to cloud his optimism
about what it might be if the judiciary listened and tried. In these last two
pieces, (Native) American Exceptionalism in particular, Phil's optimism
seemed to have come to an end.
E. SelfDetermination, Reconciliation, and Revivalso
From the despair in these last two articles, Phil moved to his last stage,
which is in some ways the most intriguing and engaged period of his
scholarship. Throughout all the phases of his work, Phil mentored students and
scholars throughout the country. But in this period, he incorporated that
mentoring into his writing, and elevated it almost to the level of exhortation.
One senses that Phil did all he could to describe, explain, justify and critique
the Court. He would never have put it this way, but I will: no one did that kind
of work better than Phil, and yet the Court remained oblivious. Therefore,
towards the end of his career, Phil changed his approach.
In Transcending Transcendental Nonsense,5 1 Phil uses Felix Cohen's
legal realism as a jumping-off point for encouraging a new realism in Indian
law. What Indian law scholarship needs more of, according to this piece, is not
carping and whining about the Court, nor treatise-like scholarship that
approaches Indian law as if it is a set of foregone quasiscientific principles
52derived from quasireligious origins. Rather, Indian law scholarship needs
47. Frickey, (Native) American Exceptionalism, supra note 42, at 488-90.
48. See, e.g., Sarah Krakoff, The Virtues and Vices of Sovereignty, 38 CONN. L. REV. 797
(2006); Sarah Krakoff, City of Sherrill v. Oneida Indian Nation of New York: A Regretful
Postscript to the Taxation Chapter in Cohen's Handbook of Federal Indian Law, 41 TULSA L.
REV. 5 (2005).
49. See ROBERT T. ANDERSON, BETHANY BERGER, PHILIP P. FRICKEY & SARAH KRAKOFF,
AMERICAN INDIAN LAW: CASES AND COMMENTARY 584 (2008) (describing Native American
Rights Fund's Tribal Supreme Court Project).
50. The period of Self-Determination in federal-tribal relations dates from 1961, when
Termination policies were abandoned, to the present. Congress and the executive branch have
consistently supported policies of tribal self-government throughout this period. See DELORIA &
LYTLE, supra note 13, at 21-24.
51. Philip P. Frickey, Transcending Transcendental Nonsense: Toward a New Realism in
Federal Indian Law, 38 CONN. L. REV. 649 (2006).
52. As Phil put it: "the classic treatise assumes law is found, not made, and consists of
abstract rules with eternal life, not necessarily tentative conclusions subject to reconsideration and
extinction at the intersection of law and life. The highest goal of the treatise is to be like the Bible
with pocket parts." Id. at 652.
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more nuanced, contextual study of actual happenings in Indian country that
relate to or derive from law.
In a speech delivered at the University of Kansas's annual conference on
tribal law and institutions, Phil provided some of his own context, describing
growing up in the small town of Oberlin, Kansas.53 Phil used his personal
experiences to make the point that in Oberlin and other small towns, formal law
often plays a background role to social and cultural norms. The formal legal
institutions are there if residents need them, but they do not play a prominent
role in most of what actually happens. Despite this, small-town America is not
the object of undue suspicion by members of the dominant society. To the
contrary, small towns are often idealized for just this sort of legal informality.
Tribal communities, however, are sometimes subject to a fair amount of
suspicion based on the assumption that they operate like small town America,
whether they actually do or not.
More often than not, at least five and sometimes nine justices of the
Supreme Court make uninformed assumptions of this kind. For example, in
Nevada v. Hicks, Justice Souter concurred in the decision, which held that a
tribal court lacked jurisdiction over tort and civil rights claims brought by a
tribal member against state law enforcement personnel, and stated in his
reasoning that the "law applicable in tribal courts is a complex 'mix of tribal
codes and federal, state, and traditional law,' which would be unusually
difficult for an outsider to sort out."54 Justice Souter implied that it would
therefore be unfair to subject such outsiders to the tribal court's jurisdiction.55
Yet it is not clear why such a mixture would be any more difficult to sort out in
tribal courts than it is in state courts, which blend common law, state statutes,
federal law, and perhaps municipal law and assorted regulations. Similarly, in
Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe-the Court's debut of its contemporary
common law methodology for divesting tribes of retained inherent powers-the
Court pointed to the alien and unrepresentative nature of tribal courts in its
concluding paragraphs to bolster its holding that tribes lack criminal
jurisdiction over non-Indians. 5 6
Phil's point about Oberlin, Kansas, is that scholars should, among other
things, do the important work of describing and assessing how contemporary
tribal institutions and communities actually work so that the suspicions are
harder to justify. I will use Oberlin for a different but related purpose-to tell a
story, not about the workings of tribal institutions per se, but about the
53. Philip P. Frickey, Address at University of Kansas Conference on Tribal Law and
Institutions, February 2, 2008: Tribal Law, Tribal Context, and the Federal Courts, 18 KAN. J.L.
& PUB. POL'Y 24 (2008).
54. Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 384-85 (2001) (Souter, J., concurring) (internal citation
omitted).
55. See id. at 385 (indicating that the purported difficulty of discerning tribal law supports
the conclusion that the tribe lacks jurisdiction).
56. 435 U.S. 191, 210-11 (1978).
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inextricably intertwined fate of American Indian tribes and all the immigrants
that followed in the wake of Columbus. That fate is a product of the United
States' reactions to the unrelenting claims of Indian nations to persist on their
own terms. The institutional relations that grew out of these origins comprise
the core of federal Indian law, a point that Phil emphasized throughout his
work.
II
THE LAST INDIAN RAID IN KANSAS, OR THE ODYSSEY OF THE NORTHERN
CHEYENNE?
If one happens to peruse the Oberlin, Kansas, website, one of the first
things to catch the eye is a prominent photo of a sign that reads "The Last
Indian Raid Museum." 57 Today, the museum is officially known as the Decatur
County Museum, but the webmasters for Oberlin and the Museum have not
caught up with that change.5 8 And a good thing too, or this researcher would
not have stumbled on the incredible story of Indian-non-Indian relations that
touched down near Oberlin, in Decatur County, Kansas, in the autumn of 1878.
Decatur County Museum, June 2009 (Photo by Sarah Krakoff)
What was The Last Indian Raid? The Kansas Historical Society has made
many historical documents available online, so the curious can learn about the
Last Indian Raid from early local accounts. If one starts with those, one learns
57. See Town of Oberlin, Kansas, http://www.oberlinkansas.org/towns/oberlin.htm1 (last
visited Aug. 5, 2009).
58. As I later confirmed in person, the most prominent signs on the museum still announce
"The Last Indian Raid Museum," and the current brochure reads "Last Indian Raid on Kansas
Soil; Visit the Decatur County Last Indian Raid Museum." See Last Indian Raid on Kansas Soil
(brochure from the Decatur County Museum) (on file with author).
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that the raid took place over the span of a couple of days from September
through October, 1878, when a group of Indians tore through northwestern
Kansas, stopping in Decatur County long enough to kill several settlers.
According to one local paper, the Indian perpetrators were "Cheyennes
who had broken out of their reservation in Indian territory" and were seeking
revenge for an 1875 attack on a group of Indians at Cheyenne Hole in Decatur
County.59 According to this account "[the Indians] did not do any real damage
until they reached Decatur County where they raided a ranch home and killed
nineteen settlers."60 Another Kansas newspaper, however, estimated the total
number of people killed in Kansas as "from seventy-five to one hundred." 61
According to this paper, the Northern Cheyenne "had been moved from their
northern hunting grounds against their will" and "chafed under the restrictions
of the agency."62 Yet another source reported that the Cheyenne left the reserv-
ation in the Indian Territory because they were "dissatisfied with the rations." 63
Yet even while these very local accounts were cementing into the Last
Indian Raid story, other histories were being recorded. For example, an
individual named Wild Hog was one of the Northern Cheyenne men to take
part in the Raid. When Wild Hog was imprisoned after surrendering to the U.S.
cavalry in Fort Robinson, Nebraska, he provided a first-hand account of the
Cheyenne's trek.64 After the Sioux and the Northern Cheyenne fought together
at the 1876 Battle of the Little Bighorn, a disaffected Cheyenne named Broken
Dishes agreed with the U.S. Cavalry's Colonel Mackenzie to remove the
Northern Cheyenne to the Indian Territory (present-day Oklahoma). Without
the counsel or consent of the rest of the tribe, Mackenzie ordered the removal
to proceed, and the Northern Cheyenne were forced to join the Southern
Cheyenne on a small, malaria-ridden reservation. Fifty children died of measles
and many others were stricken with malarial fevers.
The Northern Cheyenne begged for permission to go back home to the
Northern Plains.6 6 In fact, they had understood that they could return home at
any time if they found the conditions in the Indian Territory unsatisfactory. But
59. Kirby Ross, Forgotten History-Phillips County Indian Scares, The Last Indian Raid
Scare of 1878, PHILLIPS COUNTY REV., available at http://www.phillipscountyreview.com/
pages/indianscare4.pdf.
60. Id
61. T.A. McNeill, When Kansas Was Young: The Last Indian Raid in Kansas, THE
WESTERN STAR (Jan. 23, 1920), available at http://www.rootsweb.ancestry.com/
-kscomanc/indian raid 1878.html.
62. Id.
63. 1 KANSAS: A CYCLOPEDIA OF STATE HISTORY, EMBRACING EVENTS, INSTITUTIONS,
INDUSTRIES, COUNTIES, CITIES, TOWNS, PROMINENT PERSONS, ETC. 328 (Frank W. Blackmar ed.,
1912).
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Mackenzie refused their requests. It was then that a group plotted to leave
under the leadership of Dull Knife and Little Wolf, another respected Northern
Cheyenne chief. According to Wild Hog, the eventual violence in Oberlin
began in southwest Kansas, initiated by soldiers who fired shots when the
67
migrating Cheyenne intended only to talk.
Historians have largely corroborated Wild Hog's version, while providing
broader perspective. According to historians' accounts, the Last Indian Raid
was but one segment of the Northern Cheyenne's multi-year struggle to return
to the northern plains.68 While a telling of this story could probably begin even
earlier,69 it is reasonable to start when Wild Hog did, with the Battle of the
Little Big Horn in June, 1876, when some Northern Cheyenne sided with the
Sioux in their famous defeat of Lt. Col. George Armstrong Custer's Seventh
Cavalry. 70 This clash embroiled the Northern Cheyenne in the Great Sioux War
and intensified the Cavalry's efforts to subdue the Cheyenne and remove them
to the Indian Territory.7 1 Just five months later, in November of 1876, Colonel
Mackenzie led Cavalry members in an attack in Wyoming Territory on the
winter lodges of a band of Northern Cheyenne led by Dull Knife, Little Wolf,
and Wild Hog.7 2 The Cavalry killed or wounded close to one hundred Northern
Cheyenne and burned their lodges filled with food, robes, hides, and supplies.
The attack marked the beginning of the end of Northern Cheyenne resistance to
removal. The band fled north to Montana, and some took refuge with the
Oglala Lakota, but by spring of 1877, Little Wolf and Dull Knife had
surrendered at Fort Robinson, Nebraska:
For many Cheyennes, hope died when Little Wolf surrendered in
February of 1877. When Dull Knife's party arrived on April 21,
although other bands were still scattered, the process of defeat was
finalized. The thirteen-year history of resisting the whites, which
started in the wake of the Sand Creek Massacre of the southern people
in 1864 and ended with Mackenzie's destruction of the Northern
Cheyenne village in the Big Horns, had for many seemed a lifetime.73
67. Id
68. JOHN H. MONNETT, TELL THEM WE ARE GOING HOME: THE ODYSSEY OF THE
NORTHERN CHEYENNE (2001). Monnett's is the most scholarly work addressing the Northern
Cheyenne's Odyssey. See also STAN HOIG, PERILOUS PURSUIT: THE U.S. CAVALRY AND THE
NORTHERN CHEYENNES (2002); VERNON R. MADDUX & ALBERT GLENN MADDUX, IN DULL
KNIFE'S WAKE: THE TRUE STORY OF THE NORTHERN CHEYENNE EXODUS OF 1878 (2003).
69. For example, the story could begin with the Sand Creek Massacre in 1864, when
Colonel Chivington led the Cavalry in slaughtering a band of Southern Cheyenne that included
many women and children. See MONNETT, supra note 68, at 13.
70. Seeid at4,11.
71. See id
72. See id. at 3-4; see also HOIG, supra note 68, at 10-17.
73. MONNETT, supra note 68, at 12-13.
2010] 1267
CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW
A. The Relocation of the Northern Cheyenne to Indian Territory
From Fort Robinson, the Northern Cheyenne were forced to relocate to
Darlington Agency in the Indian Territory. There is some confusion over the
Northern Cheyenne's acquiescence to the removal. According to Wild Hog, the
disgruntled Broken Dishes entered into the disfavored agreement with
Mackenzie. 74 Historian Richard Monnett, however, indicates that Calfskin Shirt
(a minor chief) and Standing Elk (who had come under Calfskin Shirt's
influence) were the ones who promised the Cavalry that the Northern Cheyenne
would move. 75 Regardless of who acquiesced, it is clear that Little Wolf, Dull
Knife, and Wild Hog, whom the tribe viewed as its legitimate leaders, resisted
the removal. Those chiefs relented only after believing they had a promise that
they could return north if they found the conditions at Darlington Agency
unsatisfactory. 76 The Northern Cheyenne thus consented to their removal
conditionally, and, though angry, they nonetheless peacefully followed their
military escort south:
"Lots of Cheyenne were angry," Wooden Leg [a Northern Cheyenne
tribal member] recalled, but most, like Little Wolf, became resigned to
the move, at least for the moment. "My two sons .. . said it was the
only thing our family could do," Iron Teeth [another tribal member]
remembered. "I suppose all of the other Cheyennes felt the same way.
So all of us were taken to the lands of the South."77
On August 5, 1877, the Northern Cheyenne arrived at Darlington Agency,
which registered 937 Indians, including approximately 235 men, 312 women,
and 386 children.78 (Also registered at Darlington Agency, having made the
trek with the Northern Cheyenne, were four members of the Arapaho tribe.)7 9
The conditions at Darlington Agency quickly proved disastrous. According to
Monnett, "[T]hree calamities overtook the Northern Cheyennes ... hitting the
close followers of Little Wolf and Dull Knife especially hard. Disputes with the
Southern Cheyennes, inadequate food, and epidemics devastated the
newcomers until they could no longer tolerate life in Indian Territory."80
With respect to the first problem, the Northern and Southern Cheyenne
were initially pleased to reunite, but it had been more than a decade since they
had been together. In the interim, the Northern Cheyenne had forged close ties
with the Lakota, many of them marrying into Lakota society and adopting
aspects of Lakota culture and religion. By contrast, the Southern Cheyenne had
created familial and cultural ties with other southern tribes, including the
74. See The Captive Cheyennes, supra note 64.
75. MONNETT, supra note 68, at 22-23.
76. Id. at 23.
77. Id. at 24 (citations omitted).
78. Id. at 25.
79. Id.
80. Id at 27.
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Kiowa, Comanche, and Arapaho.81 Inadequate government supplies (which
pitted the groups of Cheyenne against each other), as well as Little Wolf and
Dull Knife's resistance to what they perceived to be the assimilationist ways of
the southern people, widened the rift.82
Second, government provisions were low from the start. The Treaty of
1876, which outlined the terms of removal, promised that every Indian would
receive a daily ration of one-and-a-half pounds of beef, one-half pound of flour,
and one-half pound of corn.83 The stipulated food was either never provided, or
on occasion withheld in an attempt to "force speedy compliance with mandated
agricultural training." 84 'We were always hungry,' Wild Hog later testified,
'we never had enough.'" 8 5 The plan to convert the Northern Cheyenne to
farmers was equally poorly planned and provisioned. The Darlington Agency
lacked agricultural supplies, and in any event the Northern Cheyenne had
arrived at Darlington too late to plant crops for the following year's harvest. 86
In addition, Little Wolf s and Dull Knife's followers resisted their forced con-
version to yeoman farmers, so the Indian Agent at Darlington provided what
little equipment there was to those who more readily accepted assimilation.8 7
Finally, malnutrition combined with disease to render conditions at
Darlington Agency intolerable for the Northern Cheyenne. In addition to being
weakened by hunger, they lacked immunity to the heat-borne illnesses-
measles and malaria-that ran through the camps. 8 The Darlington Agency did
not keep precise records of the number killed by disease at the time, but Wild
Hog recounted that fifty Northern Cheyenne children had died.89 Other
estimates varied, with one indicating that fifty-eight children died from all the
camps during the winter of 1877-1878, and another that forty-one of Little
Wolf s band alone died during the same period.90 Many who survived suffered
the recurring misery of malaria, made more acute by the inadequate provision
of medical supplies. For example, quinine did not arrive at the Agency until the
winter of 1879, after Little Wolf and Dull Knife had fled.91 As recounted by the
81. See id. at 27-28; see also HoIG, supra note 68, at 36 ("Despite the happy reception they
had received when they arrived, their relations with the southerners had quickly become strained.
The southerners contemptuously called them 'Sioux Cheyenne' because of their close association
and intermarriage with that tribe." (citation omitted)).
82. MONNETT, supra note 68, at 28.
83. Id. at 31 (citing I CHARLES J. KAPPLER, INDIAN AFFAIRS: LAWS AND TREATIES 189
(1904)).
84. Id. at 31.
85. Id. at 32 (citation omitted); see also Editorial, The Refractory Cheyennes, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 15, 1878, at 4 (describing testimony by army officers admitting that rations were short and
irregularly delivered at Darlington Agency).
86. MONNETT, supra note 68, at 36.
87. See id
88. See id at 37.
89. See The Captive Cheyennes, supra note 64.
90. See id.; see also HoIG, supra note 68, at 47.
91. See MONNETT, supra note 68, at 38.
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Northern Cheyenne tribal member Wooden Leg, "'To us it was a new kind of
sickness .... Chills and fever and aching of the bones dragged down most of
us to thin and weak bodies."' 9 2
By summer of 1878, ravaged by illness and chafing at confinement, the
Northern Cheyenne longed acutely for the northern plains and mountains. Little
Wolf resolved to lead his people back home, with Dull Knife in agreement.9
Little Wolf approached the Indian Agent John D. Miles some time between
July and early September. He stated to Agent Miles that his people wished to
return to the north, and requested permission to go to Washington to negotiate
with higher authorities if Miles lacked the power to authorize their return. 9 4
Agent Miles refused, stating that Little Wolf and his people would have to stay
at least another year before Miles would consider allowing them to leave.95
Little Wolf and the other Northern Cheyenne leaders viewed this refusal as a
violation of the terms of their agreement to come to Darlington Agency, which
included the proviso that they could leave if conditions were unsatisfactory.96
They returned to camp to discuss Miles's position, and the Agency police soon
approached to see if Little Wolf s band intended to leave. Little Wolf sent the
police back with the message that he was going to move his band further up ri-
ver and would report back to Agent Miles when they had decided what to do. 9 7
Conditions in the camp were now edgy, and three of Little Wolf s
followers fled on their own to return to their home territory. 98 Miles demanded
that Little Wolf turn over ten of his men as hostages until Miles's soldiers could
recover the three who had escaped. Little Wolf refused, arguing that the three
would never be recovered, and that he would therefore lose the ten hostages
permanently.99 Agent Miles insisted, and still Little Wolf refused: "'You and I
have always been friends,' Little Wolf said, 'but today I cannot do for you what
you ask. I do not want any trouble, nor do I wish to have blood shed at this
agency, but I cannot do what you ask."' 100 Agent Miles would not relent on his
demand, and Little Wolf refused to give in. He shook Miles's hand and left,
requesting that the Agent at least give him and his followers time to get beyond
Darlington Agency so that blood would not be spilled there:
"My friends," he informed them with finality, "I am now going to my
camp. I do not wish the ground about this agency to be made bloody,
but now listen to what I say to you. I am going to leave here; I am
92. Id. (quoting THOMAS B. MARQUIS, WOODEN LEG: A WARRIOR WHO FOUGHT CUSTER
320 (Univ. of Neb. Press 1986) (1931)).
93. See id at 38-39.
94. See id at 40.
95. See id. at 40.
96. See id.; see also The Captive Cheyennes, supra note 64.
97. MONNETT, supra note 68, at 40.
98. See id. at 40.
99. See id. at 40-41.
100. Id at 41.
1270 [Vol. 98:1253
THE LAST INDIAN RAID IN KA NSAS
going north to my own country. I do not wish to see blood spilt about
this agency. If you are going to send your soldiers after me, I wish that
you would first let me get a little distance away from this agency. Then
if you want to fight, I will fight you, and we can make the ground
bloody at that place."
10'
Little Wolf returned to his camp, and he and Dull Knife left the Agency late on
September 9, 1878, leading a total of 353 Northern Cheyenne, including ninety-
two men, 120 women, sixty-nine boys, and seventy-two girls. 102 Of the men,
"[o]nly 60 or 70 were seasoned warriors."' 03
B. The Flight to Kansas and Military Conflict Between the Northern Cheyenne
and the Federal Cavalry
So far, the story of the Last Indian Raid is one of a people being treated as
an object of military strategy and subject to the predominant policies of the era,
including: armed conflict, treaty making, confinement to reservations, and
assimilation.104 From the Northern Cheyenne perspective, the government
broke its promise to permit the Cheyenne to decide for themselves whether to
stay at Darlington Agency, and the Cheyenne had no obligation to be subject to
the increasing misery and attrition they suffered there. 05 This perspective
differs quite markedly from the early Kansas accounts. Those accounts
understandably begin with the killings of the settlers, but then frame the actions
of the Northern Cheyenne either as acts of revenge or petulant anger at being
"dissatisfied" with rations.106 The broader historical context reveals, consistent
with Phil Frickey's persistent suggestion about how best to view American
Indian law, a structural relationship between peoples-the Northern Cheyenne
and the expansionist United States at late-nineteenth century. As historian
Monnett editorialized:
The Indian Bureau only had themselves to blame for the exodus of
Little Wolf s and Dull Knife's Northern Cheyennes from Darlington
Agency. Their demands that the Indians learn agriculture and send
their children to the agency school for subservient labor roles within
white society were too precipitate to be effective. To expect peoples,
who in 1877 had been at war with the United States, under the stress
factors of inadequate food and epidemic, to become assimilated into
their enemy's culture within one year, was not only unwise policy, but
101. Id. at 42.
102. Id. at 43.
103. Id. at 43.
104. See ANDERSON ET AL., supra note 49, at 77-103.
105. See The Refractory Cheyennes, supra note 85 (articulating support for the view that
the government's broken promises caused the Northern Cheyenne exodus from the Oklahoma
reservation.)
106. See sources cited at notes 59-63, supra.
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was also an ethnocentric, paternalistic, and arrogant assumption.' 07
These events bring us to the brink of the Cheyenne's flight through
Kansas. The cavalry responded to a series of impressive maneuvers by the
Northern Cheyenne with initial hesitation and then military bungling. This
eventually led to the killings and mistreatment of the settlers in and around
Oberlin, who were largely innocent bystanders to the larger conflict. The first
battle with the Cavalry, and the first deaths of white civilians, occurred just
south of the Kansas border. The Northern Cheyenne refused to surrender and
evaded capture at The Battle of Turkey Springs, Indian Territory, on September
13, 1878.08
Around the same time, young Northern Cheyenne scouts killed Rueben
Bristow and Fred Clark, cattle hands working for a nearby ranch.109
Motivations for the killings remain unclear. Some writers, including Mari
Sandoz, have claimed that the civilians had already fired at the Northern
Cheyenne at Turkey Springs, intimating that the scouts were acting only in
response to the attack."10 Monnett rejects the connection, arguing that there is
some dispute about whether Bristow and Clark were killed before or after the
Battle at Turkey Springs."' And even if they were killed after the battle,
Monnett contends the scouts were unlikely to have heard about it: "[t]hus the
incident likely was not an act of revenge by the Cheyennes for Turkey
Springs."1 2 However, Monnett allows for the possibility that Bristow and
Clark were shooting at the Northern Cheyenne to protect their livestock. Thus,
while orders came from Little Wolf and Dull Knife for the scouts to fire only
on the military, the boundaries of the conflict were likely far more fluid in the
eyes both of white cowboys and settlers as well as the younger Northern
Cheyenne." 3
As they headed north, the Northern Cheyenne continued to evade the
military, and crossed the state line into Kansas some time on late September 16
or early September 17. The federal troops"14 caught up with them on September
18, and a slow and painstaking chase across the plains followed. There were
battles at Sand Creek on September 21-22 and at Punished Woman's Fork on
September 27. Also on September 27, the Fourth Cavalry destroyed the
Northern Cheyenne's pony herd."'5 By this time, in addition to the two
cowboys just south of Kansas, the Northern Cheyenne had killed ten people,
107. MONNETT, supra note 68, at 42.
108. See id at 53-57.
109. See id. at 57.
110. See id at 57-58; MARI SANDOZ, CHEYENNE AUTUMN 28 (1953).
111. See MONNETT, supra note 68, at 58.
112. Id
113. See id. at 59.
114. Additionally, civilians, interested in defending their range rights in southwestern
Kansas, joined the military.
115. See MONNETT, supra note 68, at 61-74.
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wounded five others, and taken or destroyed 640 head of livestock.I1 The
people of Kansas paid increasing attention, with some newspapers fostering
hysteria by including dramatic depictions of settlers abandoning their homes in
fear and others downplaying the attacks out of concern for hurting the local
economy.1 17
Unfortunately, the worst attacks were yet to come. The Northern
Cheyenne's loss of their pony herds precipitated greater scavenging for
supplies by the young scouts. Deprived of their horses, food, and other
necessities, scouts had a greater impetus to raid non-Indians, despite Little
Wolf's and Dull Knife's repeated commands not to involve civilians. From
September 30 to October 1, young Northern Cheyenne scouts killed a total of
thirty-one settlers in Decatur and Rawlins Counties. The details of these events
are painful, and include mistreatment and assault of women and children.
Apparently, the Cheyenne disregarded some of the settlers' willingness to
surrender their belongings in exchange for keeping their lives." 8 Below is just
one snapshot of the incident, recounted by someone who lived through it:
[A] very pathetic scene occurred during the night. One of the guards
heard someone moving, halted them, and upon investigation found it to
be old Mrs. Laing and two young daughters, who had come from their
home on the north fork some eight miles northwest of Keefer's ranch.
After the Indians had destroyed their home and mistreated them,
finally throwing the two young girls into a straw bed and were about to
set fire to it, an old chief interfered and taking the mother and girls
outside told them to go. They had traveled most of the night trying to
find some place of refuge." 9
Brutality was not the sole province of the Northern Cheyenne, however.
Some of the Oberlin settlers, in search of the Cheyenne perpetrators,
bludgeoned a feeble elderly Northern Cheyenne to death, scalped a younger
Northern Cheyenne who had been wounded, and shot and killed another,
leaving his body behind, unburied and sticking out of a prairie dog hole.' 2 0
And as the Northern Cheyenne fled north, the events of September 30-
October 1, 1878, followed them. Outrage and fear among the white population
generated greater military support and determination. Though Little Wolf's and
116. See id. at 74.
117. See id. at 75.
118. See id. at 78-103; HOIG, supra note 68, at 137-45. But see SANDOZ, supra note 110,
passim (minimizing killings and abuse by the Cheyenne and explaining the Kansas deaths as
revenge killings for the 1875 massacre of Cheyenne at Sappa Creek).
119. F.F. Bliss, Personal Recollections of the Indian Raid September 30, 1878 (1929),
reprinted in A GENERAL HISTORY OF THE INDIAN RAID SEPTEMBER 30, 1878 IN DECATUR
COUNTY, KANSAS 22 (Sharleen Wurm ed., 2004) (available at the Decatur County Museum and
on file with author).
120. See MONNETT, supra note 68, at 89-90 (describing these events, and also noting the
difficulty of discerning whether the second was a distinct victim or both accounts were two
slightly different descriptions of the same Cheyenne victim).
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Dull Knife's bands succeeded in crossing into Nebraska together, they parted
ways in mid-October, 1878, under the increasing pressure from the federal
troops.12 1 Little Wolf wanted the people to remain together and to continue
north to the Powder River country. Dull Knife preferred to head to the Red
Cloud agency near Fort Robinson, where some of his people had relatives
among the Oglala Lakota.12 2
C. The Capture of the Northern Cheyenne by Federal Troops and their
Subsequent Attempt at Escape
Dull Knife led roughly 149 people toward Red Cloud, not realizing that
the Agency had been closed. On October 23, 1878, Dull Knife and his
followers met with federal troops and reluctantly surrendered to them, agreeing
to be led to Fort Robinson. Dull Knife, Wild Hog, and other leaders attempted
to negotiate an agreement to allow them to join the Oglala Lakota at their new
agency, but Captain Johnson, the military leader on site, refused.123 The
military forced the Cheyenne, now considered prisoners of war, to Fort
Robinson and placed them in barracks. Military officials informed the
Cheyenne that they would have to stay for three months while the government
decided whether to return them to the Indian Territory or allow them to settle
with the Sioux on one of the northern reservations.124
For the first two months of captivity, conditions were tolerable and the
Northern Cheyenne remained optimistic that, upon their release, they would be
permitted to stay in the North.125 Relations between some of the soldiers and
the Northern Cheyenne were mutually respectful and friendly, occasionally
even playful.126 Yet plans were being made behind the scenes to return Dull
Knife and his people to the Indian Territory. 127 The state of Kansas wanted the
Northern Cheyenne turned over to them for temporary custody while they
investigated the killings in Decatur County and elsewhere, and eventually the
Secretary of the Interior, Carl Schurz, agreed.128 He sent orders to Fort
Robinson to march the Northern Cheyenne back to Kansas, for eventual return
121. See id. at 109-10.
122. See id at 110.
123. Seeid atl3.
124. See id.
125. See id. at 116-17; see also SANDOZ, supra note 110 (describing the beginning of the
Northern Cheyenne's captivity at Fort Robinson as a positive change from the preceding,
harrowing journey).
126. See MONNETT, supra note 68, at 116 (quoting Sergeant Carter P. Johnson, one of the
guards at Fort Robinson, as recalling that the Northern Cheyenne were "comfortable enough" and
that they "would often stick their heads out of the windows and talk with the guards outside. They
had a club . .. which they had pulled out of the barracks. They would sometimes stick this out and
wave it, in fun") (citation omitted).
127. Id. at 117.
128. See id.
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to the Darlington Agency.129 Dull Knife and Wild Hog refused to go, asserting:
"'That is not a healthful country, and if we should stay there, we would all
die . . .. No, I am here on my own ground, and I will never go back. You may
kill me here; but you cannot make me go back."'
1 30
In the face of resistance, Captain Henry W. Wessells, temporary
commander of Fort Robinson, issued two orders. The first, on January 5, 1879,
cut off food and firewood to the Cheyenne to force them to comply. The
second, on January 8, cut off all water.' 3' The Northern Cheyenne, now
confined full-time to their barracks, still refused to comply. Instead, they
plotted an escape, planning to use the handful of weapons that they had
concealed from the soldiers by hiding them in women's dresses and
floorboards.13 2 On January 9, 1879, the roughly 125 weakened Northern
Cheyenne, mostly women and children, burst forth from the barracks shooting
and prepared for death:
They prepared to make a dash for freedom-or death. George B.
Grinnell states that it was Little Shield who said, "Now, dress up in
your best clothing. We will all die together." Said another, according
to Grinnell, "We may as well die here as be taken back south to die
there." Yet another Cheyenne, according to Grinnell's interviews, said,
"It is true that we must die, but ... we will die fighting."l 33
Many did die. The escape from Fort Robinson was fantastic yet doomed.
Women fled while carrying their children; the ones who survived the initial
rounds of bullets hid in bluffs and caves. Many were found and bludgeoned or
killed at close range, sometimes by civilians who had enlisted themselves in the
battle.134 Yet it took Captain Wessells and his soldiers until January 22 to
subdue the last of the escapees. On that day, eighteen men and older boys, as
well as fourteen women and young children, resisted in a final battle against
nearly 150 soldiers.'3 5 The Northern Cheyenne were hunkered down in a pit
behind a shelter they had constructed. Toward the end, the ferocity of their
determination not to give in was evident in the following agonizing details:
After ordering a cease fire, Captain Wessells called out for the Indians
in the pit to surrender.... During this lull in the fighting a young girl
raised a carbine over the rim .. . as a signal to the soldiers that she
wanted to come out. . . . But she never had the chance to escape, for in
the next instant her mother caught her by the hand and slit her throat,
screaming that they would never surrender.
129. See id.
130. Id. at 118 (quoting GEORGE BIRD GRINNELL, THE FIGHTING CHEYENNES 418 (1982)).
131. See id at 120.
132. See MONNETT, supra note 68, at 125.
133. Id at 124.
134. See id at 130-37.
135. See id at 149-50.
136. Id. at 151-52.
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Another mother also attempted to kill her child and then herself rather
than give up to the soldiers.'37 In the end, both daughters survived, but when
one of the soldiers offered to assist one of the mothers, who was bleeding
profusely, "she grasped his hand and spit into his face in one last act of hatred
and defiance." 3 8
Several Midwestern and East Coast newspapers covered the Northern
Cheyenne's treatment at Fort Robinson, and their courageous and ill-fated
flight.139 Word got back to the public and Washington, D.C., and galvanized
support for the Northern Cheyenne, despite the negative publicity following the
Kansas killings. The following editorial in the New York Times provided
extensive detail about the Cheyenne odyssey from start to finish, and though
critical of the Northern Cheyenne in some respects (and in particular with
regard to the killings in Kansas), it nonetheless reserved the harsher judgment
for the federal government:
The bloody affair at Fort Robinson is, let us hope, the final scene in
an Indian drama which, from beginning to end, has been a disgrace to
the Government and the people. The Cheyenne bands of Dull Knife
and Old Crow are not, it is true, the sort of Indians to excite
sentimental sympathy .... They committed many outrages, on their
road through Kansas .... Nevertheless, it is a demonstrable fact that
the Government had been shamefully remiss in its treatment of these
Indians, and thus tempted them to the revolt which has had so bloody a
course and ending.
That the dead of Winter should be chosen for their return to the
Indian Territory was quite worthy of a Governmental policy which has
repeatedly picked out this season for such purposes; that their refusal
to go should be followed by disciplining them with starvation was
perhaps not unexpected, because the Government first agrees to give
Indians specific annual rations as a consideration for going to the
Indian Territory, and then, when they have gone, cuts down the rations
unless they will work. It had been intended to give up a good part of
these Indian warriors in Kansas, on the way back, so that they might be
tried and hanged; and it should not be surprising that they preferred to
die in battle rather than at the end of a rope. These dead Indians have
been officially abused with consolatory vigor as lazy, trouble-making,
hoe-hating red rascals, who would rather hunt buffalo than draw
rations, and who would rather die than obey department circulars; but
is there, after all, in this whole miserable business anything but a
137. See id. at 152.
138. Id. at 153.
139. See, e.g., Shooting Down Fleeing Indians, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 11, 1879, at 1 (reporting
from Nebraska on January 10 and recounting the escape by Dull Knife's band from Fort
Robinson).
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shameful record for the country and for the white race?140
The Government itself, in a sense, eventually agreed with the sentiments
in the editorial. President Hayes "expressed concern over alleged 'unnecessary
cruelty' at Fort Robinson," and the army ordered an investigation of the events
even before the remnants of the Northern Cheyenne were subdued. 14 1 Most of
Dull Knife's people were allowed to remain north, with the Oglala Lakota at
Pine Ridge. Dull Knife and his immediate family had never been captured, and
they too ended up at Pine Ridge, where Dull Knife's descendants live to this
day as enrolled members of the Oglala Lakota.142
Kansas succeeded at having Wild Hog and six other Northern Cheyenne
turned over to the state for prosecution, although it was never clear that these
seven men were implicated in the civilian deaths. 14 3 Indeed, a Kansas jury
acquitted Wild Hog and the others for insufficient evidence against them.144 In
part, their successful defense was due to a change of venue from western
Kansas to Lawrence, in the east, where sentiment concerning the Northern
Cheyenne's actions had evolved.14 5 Wild Hog and his codefendants apparently
also benefitted from an arguably incompetent and distracted prosecuting
attorney, who neglected the case in favor of pursuing his romantic interests. 146
Favorable press, along with persistent Northern Cheyenne advocacy, also
eventually helped to secure a reservation in Montana for the tribe in 1884.147
A series of withdrawals and subsequent executive orders expanded the
tribe's land, and in 1900 the name was changed from the Tongue River
Reservation to the Northern Cheyenne Indian Reservation, which it remains
today.148 Although it is unclear whether Wild Hog was able to return north
himself, his testimony during senate hearings on the Northern Cheyenne
Odyssey was particularly compelling and helped to sway public opinion in
favor of his people.14 9
140. Editorial, The Cheyenne Tragedy, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 12, 1879, at 4.
141. See MONNETT,supra note 68, at 147.
142. See JOE STARITA, THE DULL KNIFES OF PINE RIDGE: A LAKOTA ODYSSEY 3 (Univ. of
Neb. Press 2002) (1995).
143. See MONNETT, supra note 68, at 173-75.
144. See id. at 181-82 (2001).
145. See id. at 181 (describing how eastern Kansas newspapers, influenced by changing
attitudes of the army toward the events and coverage by the northeastern press, had begun to
report the conditions at Darlington Agency and other facts sympathetic to the Cheyenne
defendants to the exclusion of covering the alleged crimes).
146. See id. (describing one historian's account of how the district attorney fell in love with
a New York woman during late summer of 1879, and therefore neglected his prosecutorial duties
that fall).
147. See id. at 193.
148. See id.
149. See id at 184.
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D. The Enduring Legacy of the Last Indian Raid
A snapshot of contemporary life on the Northern Cheyenne Indian
Reservation reveals that the independent spirit of Wild Hog, Dull Knife, and
the other Northern Cheyenne leaders continues. Today there are 9,496 enrolled
Northern Cheyenne tribal members, over 4,000 of whom reside on the
reservation. Ninety-nine percent of the reservation is composed of tribally
owned land. The Northern Cheyenne tribal government has an executive,
legislative, and judicial branch. The judiciary consists of ten judges, including
two elected trial judges, four appointed appellate judges, and four appointed
pro tem judges.so Chief Dull Knife College, the tribal community college,
offers vocational training, an associate of arts degree, and an associate of
applied science degree.15 1 The Northern Cheyenne economy is based on natural
resource development, agriculture, and various local businesses and service
industries. The tribe itself is the largest employer, followed by the St. Labre
Indian School, the Indian Health Service, and the Lame Deer Public Schools.
Unlike most non-Indian rural communities in Montana, which are shrinking in
size, the Northern Cheyenne population is young and growing.152
All of these details might seem ordinary today, given that there are over
560 federally recognized tribes, many of which have tripartite systems of
government and collectively possess over fifty-six million acres of tribal
land. However, their importance is apparent when contrasted with the events
in September-October, 1878, in western Kansas-the surprised and terrified
settlers, the famished and determined Indians (a fleeing nation), as well as the
aftermath of mourning, anger, and, yet, eventual reconciliation. That context of
power, violence, and conflict forms the backdrop of contemporary tribal
sovereignty for the Northern Cheyenne, and similar yet distinctive versions can
be told for every American Indian nation in the country.
IV
LESSONS ABOUT CONTEXT FOR CONTEMPORARY INDIAN LAW
A. General Lessons
Whether one sees the events just described as The Last Indian Raid (the
individual-conflict view) or as an installment in the Odyssey of the Northern
Cheyenne (the conflict-between-sovereigns view) depends on one's frame of
reference. If the timeframe is those few terrifying days in 1878 and the
150. See DUANE CHAMPAGNE, SOCIAL CHANGE AND CULTURAL CONTINUITY AMONG
NATIVE NATIONS 297-300 (2007).
151. See Demographic and Economic Information for Northern Cheyenne Indian
Reservation 2 (March, 2008), available at http://www.ourfactsyourfiture.org/admin/
uploadedPublications/2695N CheyenneRF08XWeb.pdf.
152. See id
153. See ANDERSON ET AL., supra note 49, at 34.
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perspective is that of the settlers, the Last Indian Raid view prevails. If the
perspective includes Northern Cheyenne tribal members, regional and national
reporters, and, eventually, even congressional and executive branch politicians,
a shift toward the Northern Cheyenne Odyssey view occurs. As demonstrated
in the previous Part of this article, the views of historians, who provide the
longest and deepest perspective, seal the Northern Cheyenne Odyssey
characterization as the more accurate one. To be clear, perceiving the struggles
between the Northern Cheyenne and the United States as conflicts between
sovereigns does not diminish the tragedy of the killings near Oberlin. It should,
however, help us to see the historical and political forces that led to them, and
to understand that the Northern Cheyenne's claims to govern themselves in
their own lands were justified, even if a handful of acts by individual tribal
members were not.
Phil Frickey's scholarly contributions, recounted in Part I, repeatedly call
for the Northern Cheyenne Odyssey perspective of federal Indian law. When
deciding questions that touch on tribal sovereignty, courts should recall they are
wading into the story of colonialism-the strange, wavering, and occasionally
guilt-ridden American version of it-and that the judicial role should temper
rather than foment that inherently political and often violent process.154
Judicial restraint in cases that call for the diminishment of tribal powers
does not mean that the interests of non-Indians will be overlooked. If Indian
tribes overstep the boundaries of acceptable procedural and substantive justice
in ways that impinge on non-Indian rights, Congress can (and most likely
would) respond.'55 The Northern Cheyenne Odyssey view, in other words, does
not erase the story of individual hardship. Rather it allows us to see the suffer-
ings and struggles of all involved, and to assess fairly the appropriate roles for
government actors (including federal judges) who attempt to call the shots.
B. A More Specific Lesson Drawn from the Facts of the Northern Cheyenne
Odyssey: Tribal Jurisdiction over Non-Member Indians
Some would consider their scholarly duty discharged by telling the story
of the intertwined fates of the Northern Cheyenne and the settlers of Oberlin,
Kansas-a story that intimately illustrates Phil's points that Indian law is,
centrally, about construing the structural relationship between Indian nations
and the federal government, and that grounded research is necessary to
154. See Part I, supra; see also Philip P. Frickey, Doctrine, Context, Institutional
Relationships, and Commentary: The Malaise of Federal Indian Law Through the Lens of Lone
Wolf, 38 TULSA L. REV. 5, 33 (2002) (describing how the Supreme Court has failed to heed this
concern, and instead has "elevated [itself] into ... arguably our most powerful contemporary
agent of an ongoing, evolving colonialism").
155. See id at 29-33 (noting that the Supreme Court has assumed the role of curbing tribal
powers when they impinge on non-Indian rights, and that this presents questions about
institutional competence and fairness given that it would be easier for non-Indians to convince
Congress to curb tribal powers than it has been for tribes to petition Congress to restore them).
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illuminate the contours of that relationship. But this might not be enough for
Phil himself, who excelled not only at making apt generalizations about law
and its interpretation, but also at commenting in sharp detail on how those
generalizations apply to contemporary issues and cases. It is therefore
appropriate to apply the lessons from the Last Indian Raid/Northern Cheyenne
Odyssey to a contemporary issue in Indian law: the recurring question about the
boundaries of tribal membership and the legal significance that should be
accorded to those boundaries.
Whether tribal governments have power over American Indians who are
not members of the governing tribe (typically referred to as nonmember
Indians) is a recurring and fraught issue in Indian law. In Duro v. Reina, the
Supreme Court held that tribes did not have inherent authority to prosecute
nonmember Indians for crimes and found that the tribes' limited sovereignty
extended no further in criminal matters than to tribal members.'56 The Duro
Court was following and extending the reasoning of Oliphant v. Suquamish
Indian Tribe, which held that tribes lacked criminal jurisdiction over non-
Indians.157
Scholars heavily criticized Oliphant for its freelancing common law
approach, 5 8 but the disappointment and frustration with Duro was even
greater.'59 Oliphant created a practical vacuum in law enforcement in Indian
country, because state and federal jurisdictions often fail to investigate non-
Indian crime in remote reservation locations. But Duro created a legal vacuum.
States do not have jurisdiction to prosecute crimes in Indian country committed
by Indians, and the federal government lacks the authority to prosecute
misdemeanor crimes committed by Indian perpetrators against Indian victims.
The only government with the authority to prosecute nonmember Indians for
certain categories of crimes against other Indians was and remains the tribal
government.160 The Supreme Court recognized this in Duro, but blithely
dismissed it as a problem that could be addressed by agreements with states or
corrected by Congress.' 6 Congress swiftly answered the call, passing the so-
156. 495 U.S. 676, 685 (1990).
157. 435 U.S. 191, 211 (1978).
158. See Frickey, A Common Law for Our Age of Colonialism, supra note 42, at 34-39
(reviewing Oliphant and related cases in search of a principled account of the Court's approach,
and concluding that "[o]ne is left wondering whether there is anything more substantial than a
judicial gut instinct at work in these cases"); see also, Russel Lawrence Barsh & James
Youngblood Henderson, The Betrayal: Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe and the Hunting ofthe
Snark, 63 MINN. L. REV. 609 (1979) (criticizing the Court's parsing of the historical documents).
159. See Bethany R. Berger, United States v. Lara as a Story of Native Agency, 40 TULSA
L. REV. 5 (2004) (recounting strongly negative reactions by tribal leaders and academics).
160. The exception to this is PL 280 jurisdictions, where states assumed criminal authority
over Indian country. But the weaknesses in the PL 280 states serve only to highlight the larger
problem of the impracticality of turning to states to address Indian country crime. See Carole
Goldberg-Ambrose, Public Law 280 and the Problem of Lawlessness in California Indian
Country, 44 UCLA L. REV. 1405 (1997).
161. See Duro, 495 U.S. at 697-98. This seems a strange and unworkable suggestion given
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called Duro-fix amendment to the Indian Civil Rights Act.' 62 The Duro fix
provided a concise and elegant solution to the problem by amending the
definition of "powers of self-government" in the Act to include the "inherent
power of Indian tribes, hereby recognized and affirmed, to exercise criminal
jurisdiction over all Indians"' 63 and also adding a definition of "Indian" that
included members of any Indian tribe.'6
Tribal support for the Duro fix was unified and strong.165 In addition to
creating law enforcement problems, Duro embraced an ahistorical conception
of tribal affiliation and belonging.166 The category of "tribal member," while
critical for tribes' ability to define the participants in their body politic, is also
an artifact of the complicated hierarchical relationship between tribes and the
federal government. The long and often excruciating process of severing tribal
sovereignty from intact territorial authority has led to rules that define tribal
members by lineage rather than residency. That this is a necessary, albeit
unsettling and imperfect, adaptation to a lopsided struggle over tribal political
survival cannot be fully defended here.167 But the details from the Last Indian
Raid in Kansas support the proposition that American Indians, despite the
overlay of descent-based membership rules, had and continue to have much
more fluid affinities between and among the entities that became "federally
recognized tribes."
Today, the Northern Cheyenne and the Lakota of the Pine Ridge
Reservation are two distinct, federally recognized tribes with their own
enrollment criteria. Yet the lives of the Northern Cheyenne and the Lakota
interweave throughout the story of the Last Indian Raid. During the Great
Sioux War, the Northern Cheyenne fought alongside the Lakota, and some
Northern Cheyenne fled to live with the Lakota first after the Battle at Little
Big Horn, and again after Mackenzie burned the Northern Cheyenne
villages. Yet another time, after the events in Kansas when Little Wolf and
reluctance by tribal governments to allow state jurisdiction in Indian country and state fiscal and
political concerns with doing so.
162. See 25 U.S.C. § 1301 (2006).
163. 25 U.S.C. § 1301(2) (2006).
164. 25 U.S.C. § 1301(4) (2006).
165. See Berger, supra note 159, at 11- 17.
166. See STEPHEN CORNELL, THE RETURN OF THE NATIVE: AMERICAN INDIAN POLITICAL
RESURGENCE 72-84 (1988) (describing Pre-European contact groupings of indigenous peoples
based on linguistic and cultural affiliation, with only rough correspondence to contemporary
federally recognized tribes).
167. For fuller treatment of the issue of tribal membership and its relation to tribal
governance and race, see Carole Goldberg, American Indians and "Preferential" Treatment, 49
UCLA L. REV. 943 (2002); Carole Goldberg, Descent into Race, 49 UCLA L. REV. 1373 (2002).
168. For a similar argument in the modem context, see Benjamin J. Cordiano, Note,
Unspoken Assumptions: Examining Tribal Jurisdiction over Nonmembers Nearly Two Decades
After Duro v. Reina, 41 CONN. L. REV. 265, 293-303 (2008) (examining law enforcement
problems stemming from lack ofjurisdiction over nonmembers on two reservations).
169. See MONNETT, supra note 68, at 5, 11, 20-21.
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Dull Knife's bands separated, Dull Knife sought to be reunited with Lakota
relatives and friends at the Red Cloud Agency.' 7 0 And finally, Dull Knife and
his immediate family settled with the Lakota after the escape from Fort
Robinson, leading to the Northern Cheyenne chief's family becoming known
today as the "Dull Knifes of Pine Ridge." 17 1
The Northern Cheyenne/Lakota story of interconnectedness is not
unique.172 Contemporary "federally recognized tribes" do not represent natural
categories extending back to pre-colonial times, and no one with even the most
cursory knowledge of American Indian history would argue that they do. Still,
the legal category of "federally recognized tribe" today is an essential
ingredient in the inevitably unsavory stew that constitutes the relationship
between tribal sovereigns and the federal government. Recognizing and
respecting that relationship should also entail a willingness to see that the
stories behind it are nuanced and complicated.
At times, that nuance should come forward to aid in the interpretation of
the legal categories. Should federally recognized tribes have powers over
nonmember Indians? As the Northern Cheyenne/Lakota connection indicates,
they always have and, as a cultural matter, always will. Some of those
nonmembers became members, depending on flukes of historical timing. Some
did not. Should an individual's formal status as a contemporary tribal member
determine whether tribes should be able to govern them? Or should more
practical matters be determinative, such as de facto participation in the tribal
community, notice of tribal authority, or a potential vacuum of enforcement if
the tribe cannot govern? The Court has repeatedly opted for the former, 173
while Congress, at least once, has recognized the persuasiveness of the latter set
of considerations.
The Court may some day face the question of criminal authority over
nonmember Indians again. It has already affirmed the Duro fix in the context of
a double jeopardy challenge to a federal prosecution that followed a tribal
conviction for the same acts, which raised the issue of Congress' authority to
affirm tribal inherent criminal authority over nonmembers. 17 4 But the Court set
aside equal protection and due process issues, indicating that such challenges
should be brought in the context of the tribal criminal proceedings. 175 So far,
170. Id. at I10.
171. See MONNETT, supra note 68, at 110 and accompanying text; see also STARITA, supra
note 142.
172. See ANDERSON ET AL., supra note 49, at 248 (describing several examples of federally
recognized tribes that either divide people of common ethnic, linguistic and cultural groupings, or
combine people of diverse groupings).
173. See Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676 (1990); see also Washington v. Confederated Tribes
of the Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S. 134, 160-61 (1980) (nonmember Indians residing on
reservation treated the same as non-Indians for purposes of state taxation because "nonmembers
are not constituents of the governing Tribe").
174. See United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193 (2004).
175. Id. at 208-09.
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lower courts have rejected these challenges, but the commitment to tribal
authority over nonmembers often appears to be thin if not begrudging. " Will a
thicker understanding of tribal commingling help the courts to overcome their
distaste for the messy ways in which equal protection and sovereign power
interact in federal Indian law? This commentator is doubtful, but that does not
make the true and complicated story any less worth telling.177
CONCLUSION
Perhaps it is just a coincidence that Phil was raised in Oberlin, Kansas, the
site of the Last Indian Raid, but maybe there is something more to it, something
about being from a town where "[b]ig, exciting, calamitous events have come
snapping down on the [surrounding] prairie like the bars of giant mouse
traps."l 78 Yet Oberlin has done more than escape its own traps. It has reached
some reconciliation and accommodation with its past. On the 100th one
hundredth anniversary of the Last Indian Raid, the city invited Northern
Cheyenne tribal members to Oberlin to participate in commemorations of the
events.'79 And in a small but significant gesture, the historical marker near the
graves of the settlers who were killed during the events of September-October,
1878, was at some point revised. The old version reflected predominately the
settlers' view, and read:
In September, 1878, homesick Northern Cheyennes, numbering 89
men, 112 women and 134 children, stole away from their Oklahoma
reservation under the leadership of Chief Dull Knife. Harassed only by
a small troop detachment and cowboys they moved through Kansas
killing and plundering. Western counties were terrorized, but Fort
Leavenworth discounted reports and delayed help. Weeks later 149 of
the Indians were captured in northern Nebraska. Most of them were
later killed in prison breaks and few were returned to Oklahoma. Their
escape across three states pursued by troops from three military
departments was considered a remarkable feat. Innocent victims were
forty Kansas settlers murdered on their farms. Here in Decatur county
nineteen were killed on Sappa creek. A monument stands in the
cemetery east of this marker.' 80
176. See, e.g., Means v. Navajo Nation, 432 F.3d 924, 932 (9th Cir. 2005).
177. As Phil has emphasized, a basic purpose of scholarship, even legal scholarship, is "to
make our claims about the world as valid and trustworthy as possible . . . ... Conference
Transcript: The New Realism: The Next Generation of Scholarship in Federal Indian Law, 32 AM.
INDIAN L. REV. 1, 6 (2007-2008).
178. Ian A. Frazier, A Reporter at Large: Authentic Accounts of Massacres, NEW YORKER,
Mar. 19, 1979, at 61.
179. See id at 62. The Northern Cheyenne intended to come, but could not make it. See id.
180. Text of Former Decatur County Historical Marker on US-36, Oberlin, Kansas,
http://skyways.lib.ks.us/history/sappa.html (last visited Aug. 29, 2009).
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Today, as any visitor to the graveyard where the settlers are buried can
see, the marker tells both sides of the story, starting with the Battle of the Little
Big Horn and ending with the Northern Cheyenne's imprisonment and escape
from Fort Robinson. Oberlin has adopted the Northern Cheyenne Odyssey
version of events, even while it clings to its identity as the site of the Last
Indian Raid in Kansas:
THE FLIGHT OF THE CHEYENNES
After the Little Bighorn battle in 1876, the U. S.
government forced most Northern Cheyennes from the
Northern Plains to a reservation In Indian Territory,
present-day Oklahoma. In September 1878 a group led
by Chiefs Dull Knife and Little Wolf attempted to return
to thelt homeland. Angry and embittered by their
plight, they killed settlers and herders as they fled
through Kansas.
The Cheyennes included 89 men, 112 women, and 134
children. Although some succeeded in reaching Montana.
149 were captured in northwest Nebraska. After learning
they would be sent back to the reservation, the
Cheyennes tried to escape. More than 60 were killed.
Only a few of the original group ever returned to
Indian Territory.
The Cheyennes' escape from Indian Territory while
pursued by troops from three military jurisdictions was
considered a remarkable feat. Sadly, it resulted in the
death of 40 Kansas settlers and herders& Nineteen of
themn were killed here in Decatur County. and their
(Historical Marker on US-36, Oberlin, Kansas. Photo by Sarah Krakoff, June 2009)
Maybe coming from a town that lived through violent conflict resulting
from the tragic circumstances of our nation's origins predisposes one to delve
into those roots. Maybe knowing that one's town-just a small and shrinking
Kansas plains community-managed to reach some reconciliation gives one
the hope that the rest of the country can too.
In Marshalling Past and Present, Phil wrote, "Federal Indian law is
rooted in the most basic of propositions about the American constitutional
system: it is inescapably the product both of the colonization of the western
hemisphere by European sovereigns and of the corresponding displacement of
indigenous peoples."' 8' As Phil repeatedly emphasized, the way forward that
181. Frickey, Marshalling Past and Present, supra note 8, at 383.
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neither erases nor entrenches this brutal origin story is to recognize the
sovereign status of American Indian tribes, a status that they never
relinquished. Scholars and courts should also confront honestly the contextual
and conceptual difficulties of having semi-autonomous nations within our
borders.
The story of the Last Indian Raid in Kansas, more properly the Odyssey of
the Northern Cheyenne Nation, highlights the difficulty, yet also the possibility,
of embracing this awareness in our lawmaking and legal scholarship. Initially,
the local press portrayed this story as one of individual wrongdoing that
occurred in the span of a few days. Yet when the lens is widened to some
extent by simultaneous reporting from other perspectives, including that of the
Cheyenne, it becomes clear that the Last Indian Raid in Kansas is actually part
of a larger national struggle by the Northern Cheyenne to return home.
The striking paradox of this country is that, despite the many inhumane
U.S. policies depriving tribes of their land, livelihood, and culture, other forces
have also always been at work. These include the forces that resulted in the
acquittal of Wild Hog and his peers. They also include the forces that
responded to the Northern Cheyenne's relentless efforts to get back to the
Northern Plains by creating a permanent homeland in Montana. They include
the forces in Oberlin that attempt to forge a common future out of a deeply
divided past, and the forces that today encourage and promote tribal self-
governance. Phil Frickey was one of those forces, and his scholarship will
continue to be. It makes sense that Phil's history and the history of the Northern
Cheyenne are intertwined in this way. If there ever is a reconciliation and
revival internal to federal American Indian law (that is, the Indian law written
by federal judges), Phil Frickey will have been a major force in that too.
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